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1 Lexical Specication and Meaning in Use: Traditional
Views on the Lexicon
Traditionally, the lexicon is the list of words of a language or communication
system. From a biological perspective, the lexica of human languages are special
with respect to animal communication systems because they can be freely extended,
both by the creation of new (lexical) forms and by the extension of the meaning of
these words. Notwithstanding this extensibility, the construction of dictionaries as
xed lists of words with their meanings pays o for the purposes of language
education, reliable communication and translation.
Computational models of language largely share this view, as it seems initially
reasonable to think that such a lexicon could be part of what characterizes the human
ability to code thoughts into linguistic expressions and to recover thoughts from such
expressions. What is needed for conventional dictionaries—in the tradition started
by such eminent scholars as Samuel Johnson and Jacob Grimm—is precision with
respect to the characterization of the word senses described. Such a task would be
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difficult with an entailment-based semantics only, since many word senses include
connotations that are usually but not always associated with an utterance of that
word. However, abandoning formal semantic approaches ignores the fact that the
senses distinguished by lexicographers do often reflect truth-conditional differences,
e.g. Anna went to the bank would entail ‘Anna was very near a flowing body of water’
in one of the word bank’s senses but not another. We contend that a formal account
would need to distinguish as many senses as traditional dictionaries do, and one goal
of the present paper is to suggest some steps toward such an account.
The main challenge faced by lexicographers and semanticists alike with respect
to characterizing word senses precisely is lexical disambiguation. Given the large
number of senses that dictionaries distinguish for the same word, one needs a
cognitively plausible account of the fact that listeners only rarely interpret the sense
of a word in a way unintended by the speaker. Suppose that the list of word senses
were simply a list and that lexicalisation meant just choosing a word for a concept.
Now suppose further that all concepts linked to a word after lexicalisation were
listed with it and that disambiguation occurred by making a random choice from the
list of senses. In this case, the chance of speaker-hearer coordination would be
very small, namely 1 divided by the number of word senses of the item in question.
Given that this is not what we nd, a natural extension to such a simplistic model
would be to include stochastic data with the senses. The rst type of stochastic data
to consider would be the relative frequency of the senses (such as the fact that
‘nancial institution’ is perhaps more frequent than ‘river bank’ as the intended
meaning of bank in industrialized societies), but this by itself would predict that the
best choice would always be to select the most frequent sense, so the very existence
of the other senses makes this option implausible. A second stochastic approach in
line with recent proposals (Baroni et al. 2014, Erk 2014) also includes frequency data
about the words that a given sense is likely to combine with (the “distributional
semantics” of the sense). For example, the presence of words like deposit and
savings around the word bank will bias the nancial institution interpretation.
The option of adding distributional semantics to senses needs further study. It
is, however, our suspicion that this will only work properly in combination with
a decompositional approach to senses because decomposition would be needed
for estimates in the presence of data scarceness. These distributional approaches
nevertheless aim to solve the same problem that we address in this paper, namely
that of predicting the meaning of lexical items in use (i.e. in the speech contexts in
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which they appear), but they use a dierent representation of lexical knowledge
than the one we advocate here.
The approach pursued in this paper tries to exploit semantic decomposition of
word senses to arrive at a cognitive representation that is eective in selecting the
meaning in use: one of a word’s potentially many senses that should be listed in a
full traditional dictionary. In some respects our approach is in line with other more
linguistically-oriented approaches to lexical representations. For example, it shares
the assumption of decomposability of word senses with cognitive approaches such
as Jackendo’s Conceptual Semantics (e.g. Jackendo 1996). It is similar to more
formal theories like Pustejovsky’s (1995) Generative Lexicon and Blutner’s (2004)
Lexical Pragmatics in its aim to systematically account for meaning alternations.
Our approach diers from these approaches in that, in our proposal, words typically
overspecify their meanings, and it is the combination with context that trims the
overspecied meaning down to the meaning in use, i.e. the word sense that applies.
The meaning in use may be determined by earlier language use, but it can also
be computed for the rst time.
After a discussion of semantic features in the following section, we examine
previous accounts of overspecication of meaning upon which we build. We
provide an analysis of lexical items in terms of stochastic sets of features in section
3, with an extended treatment of the verb fall in English, Dutch and German,
which demonstrates how one overspecied representation can apply in dierent
contexts resulting in dierent word senses. In section 5, we then discuss the issue
of overgeneration and the subsequent need to put constraints on the production of
words, in turn dening the lexicalization process. We conclude in section 6.
2 Semantic Features and Moderate Universalism
In this section, we want to defend the view that word senses are composed of a set
of (moderately) universal semantic features combined with natural classications
of experience. By ‘moderately universal,’ which we return to below, we mean
that any two languages will have a signicant overlap in the features they use
to construct word senses, but there may be unique features as well. To demonstrate
what we mean by “a natural classication of experience”, take the verb walk. The
particular kind of locomotion that we achieve in walking is dicult to analyse
further by people who can walk, and AI attempts at modelling it have revealed how
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little humans understand about how it functions.1 But it is part of the human
repertoire of activities and, as such, humans use it in planning their behaviour
and in recognizing it in the behaviour of other humans and animals. This particular
kind of locomotion is thus a “natural classication of experience”.
The decomposability of word senses has been a controversial issue in the litera-
ture on the lexicon. On the one hand, there are proponents of a atomistic view of the
lexicon such as Fodor (e.g. Fodor & Pylyshyn 1988, Fodor & McLaughlin 1991 and
Fodor & Lepore 2002) and more recently Relevance Theorists, e.g. Carston (2010).
On the other hand there are advocates of more complex lexical representations
such as Pustejovsky (1995). A common argument against a decompositional view is
the lack of necessary and sucient features in dening word senses (e.g. If a tiger
is dened as having four legs, does that make a three-legged tiger not a tiger?)
Furthermore, one could argue that semantic features are cognitively meaningless
if features can freely be invented and added to a representation. We argue that
semantic features are needed for overspecication and for formalizing the selec-
tion of meaning in use. We contend that these features need to be moderately
universal in order to account for the fact that knowing one language’s lexicon
helps in learning another language’s lexicon and also to account for typological
generalisations about the lexicon and morphology. But most importantly for our
purposes, universal features are needed for methodological reasons to ensure that
the decompositions of verbal meaning are cognitively meaningful. They should not
be freely inventable (since there are things that are dicult or impossible for us to
conceptualize) and, like optimality-theoretic constraints, they should preferably
come with a demonstration that they are typologically valid.
For an example of typologically-valid semantic features, one can turn to agency,
and more specically to the proto-agent and proto-patient features set out by
Dowty (1991), such as sentience, volition, control and cause. The typical agent of
walking toward the sunset forms the intention of doing so within the situation
she nds herself in, causes her movement to start, controls and monitors her
progress and has a criterion for when it is nished. The notions of agent, intending,
controlling, and end of action all belong to the realm of typologically-valid features.
1 Introductory AI texts take as given that locomotion, grasping something with your hands, and seeing
objects belong to the everyday behavioural repertoire of humans and that they turn out be much
more dicult than the naive views of these activities would suggest. The use of natural language falls
in the same category.
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Grimm (2011) shows that these features are central to the typology of case
systems, in the sense that they play a role in accounting for the variation between
languages that one nds in the realisation of case systems. Typological research
and monolingual investigation of central semantico-pragmatic themes such as case,
tense, aspect, modality and deniteness provide a large number of ostensibly-valid
semantic features.
It is further possible to give a foundation for semantic features using the semantic
map method in typology (de Schepper & Zwarts 2010). In the semantic map
approach, one studies the meaning of a word or a group of related words using
comparison with other languages, by systematically looking at translatability. This
provides a natural way of dividing words into their uses without appealing to
semantic intuitions. If one uses translations into suciently many languages, one
can map them onto a two-dimensional graph where the points are sets of translation
equivalents. If two languages do not make a meaning distinction that is made
in a third language, the rst two are connected in the graph. For example, neither
English nor French distinguishes direction and recipient in their prepositions, but
German does, which would mean that English and French are connected in the
graph for this semantic concept (Haspelmath 2003).
De Schepper and Zwarts (2010) show that such maps can be systematically
represented by feature clusters, with each of two minimally distant points diering
in precisely one feature. Ideally, the sets of features representing a map can be
analyzed in terms of typologically well-studied semantic features. This analysis
can also be taken as underpinning the view that meanings in use can be seen as sets
of semantic features.
Our approach relates to the semantic map approach and other cognitively-
oriented approaches such as Conceptual Semantics (e.g. Jackendo 1996) in the
assumption of cognitively realistic semantic features. It is still a task, however, to
dene how they combine into a logical expression that characterizes the truth-
conditional contribution of the combined features in terms of the truth-conditional
contribution of the individual features. For this purpose, it is useful to adopt
the view of (Barsalou 1992) that meanings in use should be characterized as
frames. Features typically set the value of attributes in a frame, unify attribute
values, or indicate that certain attributes have a value and that composition can be
modelled by unication. The truth-conditional interpretation of a set of attribute
value structures is the claim that the class of complex entities that meet all the
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constraints is non-empty. In contradistinction to the semantics provided for feature
structures modelling linguistic objects by, e.g., Johnson (1988), attributes for these
semantic uses must be understood as operations in the external world.2 The
object (e.g. an event of falling) would be related to whatever falls by the attribute
theme, interpreted as the operation that maps events to their themes. While in
this particular case it is not unreasonable to think that the theme in some sense
constitutes the event, the use of frames by itself does not commit one to this view.
In this respect, we see no distance between the current proposal and formal
semantics. There would be one if formal semantics were interpreted as committed
to the view that nothing could be said about the structure of meanings beyond
their contribution to truth-conditions, which would make it irrelevant for language
learning and cognition. The view defended here demands that basic features make
sense from the perspective of classical truth-conditional semantics. We forego
a discussion of the typical problems for a view of this kind: vagueness, taste
predicates, information structural features, and emotional expression.
As mentioned above, the proposal introduced here adopts a moderate form
of universalism towards linguistic lexical meanings, but it is the building blocks
of lexical meanings and not the lexical meanings themselves that are universal.
There is no assumption that any feature will play a role in all languages, nor that
any language uses all features. New semantic features may be introduced for the
description of a new lexicon if they correspond with a learnable classication.
We opt for this moderation rather than for absolute universalism on the basis
of evidence showing that speakers of one language are sensitive to semantic
dierences that speakers of other languages are not sensitive to. For example,
Korean has two variants of the English preposition in depending upon whether the
object is in a close-tting container (like a SIM card in a cell phone) or in a non-close-
tting container (like a pear in a bowl). McDonough et al. (2003) use preferential
looking tasks and a “which of these things is not like the others?” task to show that
while Korean and English infants are both sensitive to dierences in closeness
of t, as adults, only Korean speakers and not English speakers are sensitive to
this dierence. Thus, the distinction in close versus loose t as articulated in the
2 We here part company with those who like to maintain that semantics is merely in the brain. We take
the line that a proper semantics should also explain logical inference relations between natural
language utterances and thereby should have a model theory. This is the line also taken by Kamp
in DRT (Kamp & Reyle 1993). We also feel that many aspects of Conceptual Semantics allow a
model-theoretic treatment and that its proponents undersell their theory in this respect.
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Korean choice between prepositions is not present in the adult English lexicon
or in adult English cognition and should not be posited as an absolute universal.
In fact, it would be a Korean-particular extra feature in our formalisation that
has arisen through a grammaticalisation process under the inuence of a forced
choice between lexemes. Our moderate universalism leads to a decomposition
in terms of universal features (where typology and cognition supply the foundation
for the universal character) with a minimum number of additional idiosyncratic
features. We now turn to discussing previous accounts of word meanings based on
overspecication of meaning.
3 Overspecication of Meaning: The Hogeweg- Smolensky
Account
In his response to the criticism of connectionism in Fodor & Pylyshyn (1988),
(Smolensky 1991) oers an analysis in which the distributed representation of
coee can be derived by subtracting the representation of cup with coee from the
representation of cup without coee. In Smolensky’s analysis, the representation of
a cup with coee consists of a set of micro-features like ‘upright container’, ‘hot
liquid’, ‘porcelain curved surface’, ‘burnt odor’, ‘brown liquid contacting porcelain’,
‘nger sized handle’ and ‘brown liquid with curved sides at the bottom’. The
representation of cup without coee consists of the features ‘upright container’,
‘porcelain curved surface’ and ‘nger-sized handle’. If the representation of cup
without coee is subtracted from the representation of cup with coee, this yields a
representation of coee, consisting of the features ‘hot liquid’, ‘burnt odor’, and
‘brown liquid contacting porcelain’. Crucially, however, this is a representation of
coee in a particular context. In another context, other features of coee (like shrub,
red fruit, brown bean) would be activated. The features of coee that are activated
in a particular context are therefore a subset of the much larger set of features
potentially projected by coee.
Following Zwarts’s (2004) analysis of the preposition (a)round, (Hogeweg 2009)
turns this approach into an account of computing the right set of semantic fea-
tures in a context from a lexical (over-)specication using an OT grammar FIT
> STRENGTH. FIT demands that the output is consistent with the context, and
STRENGTH demands that the output set for the specication is maximal by ensur-
ing that any set larger than the output does not meet FIT.
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To illustrate the working of the two constraints, let us look briey at Hogeweg’s
analysis of the interpretation of the Dutch discourse particle wel. Like most
discourse particles, wel is highly polysemous. Hogeweg analyzes the dierent
senses of wel as ranging in strength depending upon how much information a
use presupposes. In Tableau 1, the possible interpretations are ordered according
to their strength. The strongest meaning is illustrated by the following small
conversation:
(1) a. Speaker A: Amsterdam is niet de hoofdstad van Nederland (Amsterdam is
not the capital of the Netherlands).
b. Speaker B: Amsterdam is wel de hoofdstad van Nederland (Amsterdam is
the capital of the Netherlands)
This discourse can be described as an instance of Speaker B’s correcting Speaker A.
An utterance containing wel expressing the proposition p requires that a statement
expressing the proposition¬pwas uttered. Implicit contrast, for example, is weaker
since it does not require that the proposition ¬p is expressed but just that it is
inferrable from the context. For example, in a context where a husband is putting
on his coat, his wife could utter: Je moet wel de afwas nog doen, ‘You have WEL to
do the dishes’. What is important here, however, is the interaction between the two
constraints STRENGTH and FIT. STRENGTH requires that all meaning aspects
are activated so that the word is interpreted with the strongest meaning, in this
case, a correction. A candidate violates this constraint as many times as there
are stronger interpretations available. FIT requires that the output is consistent
with the context. If wel p is uttered in a context where a statement expressing
¬p is not part of the common ground, interpreting wel as a correction violates
FIT. If there is information in the common ground from which ¬p could be inferred,
implicit contrast does not violate FIT. Note that the requirements put on the context
entail one another. (For example, if ¬p is uttered, it can also be inferred.) That
is why if an interpretation does not violate FIT, all the weaker interpretations
also meet the requirements set by this constraint.
160
Representing the Lexicon: Identifying Meaning in Use via Overspecication
(2)
Context: Husband is putting on coat.
Je moet wel de afwas nog doen.
‘You still have to do the dishes.’
FIT STRENGTH
Correction *
Contrast * *
⇒ Implicit contrast **
Surprise ***
Modier ****
The account is quite successful in the application that Hogeweg provides. It has
also been successfully applied to other types of function words such as prepositions
Zwarts (2004). Nor is it dicult to come up with further applications. Another
advantage of the approach is that, while it was developed in OT, it does not require
OT-specic mechanisms that would limit its generalizability.
For example, one can interpret FIT as the maximization of prior probability
and STRENGTH as the maximization of the likelihood of the signal given the
input. The more features associated with the word that show up in the input, the
more likely the use of the word becomes, such that adding more features projected
to an interpretation hypothesis increases the likelihood of the signal. The most
probable interpretation is thus a set of features that is as large as possible and yet
still consistent with the context. The OT system thus reduces to a decomposition
into priors and likelihoods for nding the most probable interpretation.
Perhaps this is all that one needs to model functional lexemes.3 For lexical words,
however, it runs into problems. This stems from the fact that all features are treated
as equal, whereas certain kinds of phenomena bode against such equality. These
include absolute features, dependencies among features and forced choices between
features, exemplied below. In the next section, we illustrate these properties of
feature sets by an analysis of the verb fall. The verb fall in English, Dutch, French4,
Russian and modern German is non-volitional. This property survives in all of
3 The use of already observed by (Fong 2001) as an expression of the perfect in You eat already? in
Singapore English (British English informants also report this use in informal standard English) can
be used as an argument against this view. Arguably, already expresses both surprise (at the early start
of a state) and the fact that the state started. Surprise is removed when already expresses the perfect,
but there are no uses where the perfect is removed. This makes the perfect an absolute feature
and surprise, a default feature.
4 French is not yet integrated into the formal representation of fall discussed below.
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the derived meanings, which is what makes it an instance of an absolute feature.
That there are dependencies between features can be seen for example in that
a spatial source for a use of fall such as fall to the ground forces a spatial goal and a
spatial dimension which are interconnected. Fall also forces a choice between
dimensions, including the aforementioned spatial dimension as well as moral (He
resisted the temptation for a long time, but then he fell.), fortune (fall on hard times),
and grace (fall from grace), among others.
4 Lexical Entries as Stochastic Sets of Features
In the previous section we argued for a feature-based analysis of words senses.
In contrast with the previous approaches, we argue that a word is not related to a
set of features but to a stochastic set: a distribution over sets of features. Such
distributions can be learnt from experience by counting how often the various
feature combinations are expressed by a word. However, the distribution itself
cannot be used for explaining the intersubjective status of these stochastic feature
sets. The experience of the individual users will be dierent and therefore the
distribution that they learn. While learning a distribution is what constitutes a
speaker’s competence with respect to the semantics of the word, it cannot be what
the language or the language community associates with the word.
Intersubjective convergence can be modeled by considering equivalence classes
of such distributions: the distributions that agree on 0, 1 and <. Two competent
speakers will almost certainly have dierent frequencies and probabilities for the
same feature bundle b in an interpretation of a word w. By using equivalence
classes for≤, 0 and 1, we dene competence for w as the speakers always agreeing
that bundle b is less probable than bundle c in an interpretation ofw, or that bundle
b is always, or never, occurs in such interpretations.
Let F be the set of all features. Since p(∅) = 1 and p(F ) = 0, p and q will
give 0 and 1 to the same elements if they preserve ≤. So (3) is sucient.
(3) p ∼ q i ∀b, c (p(b) ≤ p(c))↔ (q(b) ≤ q(c))
While dierent language users build up dierent distributions, a small amount
of data suces to guarantee that language users have distributions in the same
equivalence class. For specifying such equivalence classes, the following operations
can be dened in (4). Speakers know the equivalence class by having learnt or
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converging to a distribution that belongs to it by being exposed to utterances in
language use. The equivalence class (and a particular distribution in it, almost
certainly dierent from the distribution of any user) can be attributed to language
use or to the language community producing language use.
(4) absolute features: p(b) = 1
excluded features: p(b) = 0 (not normally considered)
conditionally absolute features: p(b|c) = 1
conditionally excluded features: p(b|c) = 0
forced choice: p(b1 ∨ . . . ∨ bn) = 1 and p(bi ∧ bj) = 0 for i 6= j ≤ n
default in a forced choice: b1 . . . bn : a feature bi such that p(bi) > p(bj) for
j 6= i and 1 ≤ j ≤ n
In the following, we will illustrate how such operations enable us to give a repre-
sentation of the verb fall. We chose to exemplify this approach to the lexicon
with fall not only because the central concept expressed facilitates cross-linguistic
comparison, but also because fall and its cognates typically lend themselves to
extended uses, i.e. a large number of word senses, as mentioned above. Apart
from its most straightforward interpretation as a motion verb, fall is used with
various other interpretations, including non-spatial ones such as a fallen soldier or
a fallen woman. As such, it provides a suciently dicult modeling task to develop
a representation from which all the dierent uses could be specied in a context.
In the project database based on data extraction eorts from dictionaries and the
internet, we currently have 78 uses of “fall”. This reduces to a smaller, but not much
smaller number of uses for a particular language. Example (5) lists 18 of the 35 uses
that seem acceptable in English and is meant to illustrate the variation.
(5) John fell out of the tree.
The glass fell on the oor.
John fell (down).
The house fell.
The corporal fell
The rain fell.
The evening falls.
Christmas day falls on a Sunday this year.
He fell asleep.
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His eyes fell on the gem.
The cabinet falls.
The thaw fell over the elds.
The water fell.
Dark curls fell around her white neck.
It fell into oblivion.
The goblet fell to the bottom of the river.
The waves fell on the beach.
The curtains fall.
The path falls. (goes down)
Grief fell from our hearts.
Many of these examples can be seen as metaphorical extensions from a basic use. In
canonical views on metaphors, space and in particular the up-down opposition is an
important source for metaphorical extension. As Lakoff & Johnson (1980) argue,
most of our fundamental concepts are organized in one or more spatialization
metaphors. They provide many examples in which a more abstract concept is
expressed in terms of the opposition between up and down, among which health
and life (health and life are up, sickness and death are down), morality (virtue is up,
depravity is down) and quantity (more is up, less is down), many of which are
also applicable to fall. However, the aim in this paper is not to capture metaphor but
to find meanings in use. Dead metaphors are dead and the language user is stuck
with them even if the metaphorical extension could not have happened anymore.
Our strategy stands in competition with an approach which would want to predict
the metaphorical use from a more basic use. Maybe that is possible and would
lead to similar predictions. A reason to be skeptical about that, however, is that
what works in one language does not seem possible in another in many cases and
that general accounts of metaphor, even if tied to notions like natural metaphor
will fail to predict correctly when a particular metaphor is possible and when it
is not. In our case, the starting point is what has happened already and is recorded
in the lexicon. Interestingly, we then predict more possible interpretations than
were found in the lexicon and standardly correct ones. This can be interpreted as
metaphor formation, but so far nothing very much can be claimed for this method of
finding new meanings in use. It certainly does not seem to end up (yet?) as a serious
general theory of metaphor. The aim of our account should not be confused with
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the legitimate enterprise of explaining why certain metaphors are more natural
and acceptable than others. The project may supply interesting input to such an
enterprise since our data are suggestive of what is natural and not, but the enterprise
itself will not make any contribution to this essentially psychological question.
The problem for specication is the problem of dealing with all 78 uses from
one single representation. It follows from our moderate universalism that this
should be possible and—surprisingly, since this is a strong claim—it seems that this
is the case. As it turns out, again surprisingly, the language specic representations
are not really simpler than the cross-linguistic one.
We now outline the different components of the representation. We use a frame
formalism because it comes with a natural decomposition (unlike first order logic), has
a properly defined semantics (Johnson 1988, Ait-Kaci & Podelski 1993) and has been
claimed by many to be a natural format for the description of concepts. Barsalou
(1992), Loebner (2014), Petersen & Werning (2007), and Sag et al. (2003) all give
substantial empirical evidence for a frame-like structure of mental representations.
For us, having a natural decomposition is the most important advantage and while
we regard the current development as promising, we are no way committed to
sticking to this particular formalism in future developments of this material.
Though it is too early for a detailed formal proposal, semantic features are in-
terpreted as constraints on relationally restricted frame structures, giving both the
structure of the events or states denoted and the concept of these events and states.
Equivalence classes over distributions over these features are the lexical specifications.
The lexical specications have maximal consistent sets of constraints over
features allowed by the distribution. These determine classes of frames which
in turn determine what kind of objects they can denote.
The following are examples of the dierent frame constraints on fall. Relations
and sorts are written with lower case heads, variables appear in upper case.
(6) THEME := the frame has a path attribute with the variable THEME at its end
at(THEME,LOCATION) := THEME is at LOCATION
SOURCE:location(DIMENSION) := SOURCE has the sort of being one of the
objects in DIMENSION
nocontrol(THEME) := THEME has the sort ‘nocontrol’, i.e. the theme does not
control the continuation, path or speed of the movement denoted by the verb
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A frame is thereby a statement about the external world: the external world
should contain an object that is mapped by operations in the external world
interpreting the attributes to other objects. The objects should stand in the external
relations or have the external sorts that are imposed to them by the structure.
On top of this basic structure, there is information structure implemented by
assigning or not assigning a property new to a feature. The interpretation is that
features lacking this feature should be identied in the context (or accommodated),
while new features give properly new information.
Furthermore, semantic features may be annotated for properties of the distribution.
This is so already in the case of forced choices: a forced choice x ∈ {y1, . . . , yn}
is just the features x : y1, . . . , x : yn but in a situation in which x : yi and x : yj are
inconsistent for all different i, j ≤ n. Much the same applies to implications. Other
properties of that kind are absolute and default, which in this setting is understood
as a feature that is part of some meanings in use, but can be omitted by conflicts with
the context or in the case of competition between two or more incompatible features
as the feature which is probabilistically dominant. Annotations with new and of
this distributional kind are in small capitals. Below, we detail each one in turn.
First, there is a forced choice between the type of theme occurring with fall in any
given instance (where the ‘theme’ is that which falls). The fact that this is a forced
choice means that the verb obligatorily has a theme. In a given use, the theme will be
resolved and represented as, e.g. THEME:light for an instance like The light falls
on the table. ‘Concrete’ means that the theme is a concrete object such as a person.
(7) THEME ∈ { concrete, light, precipitation, task, date, judgment, proposal}
The next two statements make the theme a non-agent of a non-action:
(8) nocontrol(THEME)
nocause(THEME)
Falling is strongly correlated with a lack of intentionality with respect to its
direct cause, the movement and its path and for all contemporary languages
considered, these are absolute features. These are also background features, as
is the specication of the theme.
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We next propose a source and a position, each of which is dened with respect to
a dimension. The source can be understood as the point of departure for the falling,
and the position as the theme’s placement at the end of the falling act.
(9) SOURCE: location(DIMENSION)
POSITION: location(DIMENSION)
DIMENSION ∈ {space, posture, life, health, moral, quantity, level,
outcome(PROCESS)}
The inclusion of the dimension specification in our analysis is necessary to our
account and is motivated by its further necessity in the analyses of the functions
direction and down, among others (only down will be discussed in this particular
paper). Dimensions are sets of positions ordered by a natural ordering relation.
Here is what is meant by each of the types included above. Space is the set of spatial
positions close to the earth ordered by the direction of gravity. Posture would be the
set of body postures ordered by degree to which they are upright, and the same for
postures of other things like walls, houses, poles, dogs, etc. It is a good idea to
make posture a dependent sort (like outcome(PROCESS)), i.e. posture(X) where X
should be filled in by the type of the theme. This assigns to each X a special set of
postures. Life is a metaphorical transfer to the “postures” alive and dead where
the first one corresponds with uprightness. Health includes healthiness and degrees
of unhealthiness ordered from more to less healthy, morality is the set of moral
states ordered from more to less moral, and quantity is the set of quantities ordered
by the greater than relation. Level corresponds to the set of levels of something
again ordered by ‘greater than’ on some numerical scale (see Lakoff & Johnson
1980 for suggestions about the origins of these metaphorical extensions).
There are a number of dimensions that have degraded into a set of down locations
for an often not very clear source. Such cases are:
(10) The prize fell on Tim. (Tim won the prize.)
A cruel fate fell on those left behind. (Dutch: Those left behind suered a
cruel fate.)
Eating falls me dicult. (Dutch: I nd it hard to eat.)
Christmas falls on Wednesday.
The task falls on me. (Dutch, German: This happens to be one of my tasks.)
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Locations for prizes in races and lotteries are the winners, locations for fates the
people whose fate they are, locations of holidays are days in the year assigned
by the holiday denition (which may involve human decisions), tasks are one by
virtue of one’s oce or of the moral order. Activities of somebody moreover assign
a degree of diculty or painfulness in the experience of that somebody. What these
cases seem to have in common is a dimension that is just a set and a process or
non-subjective procedure that assigns locations from the dimension to the theme.
Provisionally, we take these dimensions to be parametrically dened as out-
come(PROCESS) where the identication of PROCESS is crucial for the identication
of the set making up the dimension. For this last type, sources may be missing
and be identied with the process itself.
One additional diculty that arises with SOURCE pertains to cases such as
Her hair falls (perfectly), where the hair itself is not changing position, but rather,
where two dierent parts of the hair are salient, and the ends of the hair ‘fall’
by comparison with the hair nearer to the crown of the head. In these cases, which
also include falling paths, falling valleys, etc., we dene the split relation where
PART1 and PART2 are the higher and lower parts of the THEME, respectively:
(11) SOURCE=PART1
split(PART1, PART2, THEME)
For meanings in use in which split is dened, the specication that SOURCE=PART1
is obligatory in the representation (i.e. it is an absolute feature).
The next component at relates two features such that at(x, y) can be paraphrased
as ‘the x is in/on y’. For example, at(John, lying_down) indicates that John is
lying down. At is a component that appears multiple times in each representation.
One of its instances is given information, and one is new information. The one that
is given is as follows, where down picks out the set of elements in the order given
by the dimension that are lower than the one named by the source:
(12) at(POSITION, down(SOURCE,DIMENSION))
For example, at(lying_down, down(standing, posture)) would mean that the
lying down is ‘down’ (lower on the order for the posture dimension) from standing.
Another way of saying this is that lying down is down from standing with respect
to posture. The next instance of at is new information:
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(13) at(THEME,POSITION)
This is like the example above, where at(John, lying_down) indicates that John is
lying down. Taken in combination with the given/presupposed use of at, we can see
that for an example like John fell, part of the given information is that lying down
is a lower posture position than standing, but the new information includes the fact
that John is in fact now in the lying down position. This is sometimes all that
is specied as new information, but there are other cases where a movement event
is also new information. These are the cases in which a source is either specied or
implicit. Continuing this example, the source would be specied as ‘standing’
(on the posture dimension), and thus we would have new information that there
was an event in which John moved from standing to lying down, following this
specication:
(14) movement(THEME,SOURCE,POSITION)
In cases where split is dened, having the new information be
at(THEME,POSITION) would be problematic, since it is not the entirety
of the theme that is in the lower-ordered position. Thus, in these cases, we have
the following absolute feature, which is analogous to the other but with PART2
replacing THEME:
(15) at(PART2, POSITION)
(16) recapitulates the above with the universal level labels and the bar indicating the
split between given and new. It also indicates that space is the default dimension
and that at(THEME,POSITION) is the default for new information.
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(16)
THEME ∈ {concrete,light,precipitation,task,date,judgment,proposal} Absolute
nocause(THEME)
nocontrol(THEME) Absolute
SOURCE: location(DIMENSION)
POSITION: location(DIMENSION)
DIMENSION ∈ { space:default, posture, life, health, moral, quantity,
level, outcome(PROCESS)} Absolute
SOURCE= PART1 If split Absolute
split(PART1, PART2, THEME)
at(POSITION, down(SOURCE,DIMENSION)) Absolute
at(THEME,POSITION) Default, New
at(PART2, POSITION) If split Absolute, New
movement(THEME,SOURCE) If at(THEME, SOURCE) Absolute New
We will now discuss our data with respect to this representation. First of all,
there were not many dierences between the languages we examined with respect
to these representations. The full list is discussed here.
A. The dimension outcome(PROCESS) is prominent, especially in Dutch, as in (17).
(17) De prijs viel op mij.
The prize fell on me.
‘I received the prize’.
B. Older German (Grimm 2011) includes an example where the person doing the
falling was causing an action as in (18).
(18) Er el in die Sachsen.
He fell into the Saxons
‘He wildly attacked the Saxons.’
This data point is the reason that nocause(THEME) is not listed as an absolute
feature above.
C. Finally, English allows a source without a destination/position (“Grief fell from
his heart”), unlike the other languages considered. There is one further important
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type of dierence among the languages, which will be discussed in Section 5 and
force a major revision.
These three dierences indicate that small adaptations must be made to obtain
the specication for particular languages. Dutch overuse of outcome(PROCESS)
and pre-modern German’s causality with fall are two cases where one predicts
failure of comprehension between languages. Beyond that, however, speakers
of one language should be able to make sense of all the uses of the other languages.
Languages that are less related than those under discussion may, however, dier
more greatly, which is something that we are examining in our continued research.
If information from the context of the word is taken into account, the formal
model proposed here makes sense of all the uses we collected on the basis of
the language-independent specication and perhaps surprisingly lends itself to
implementation. Particularly important is the type of the theme and of the source
or location which restricts the choice of the dimension and, thereby, the sort
of the unspecied source or location (if either of these is in fact unspecied).
Finding this information is easy using prepositions and parsing. It is harder to
use information that is not syntactically coded, but clearly often necessary: he
fell can mean many things given the right context. While the specication is
good at suggesting the right questions to ask the context, the answers cannot
always be supplied by a simple heuristic method dened over the context. Despite
this, trial implementations by Jonathan Mallinson and Jacob Verdegaal show that
good results are possible when the necessary contextual information is given
syntactically and lexically. It then works to the degree that the syntactic and
lexical analysis is correct. This would be the same in cases where one cannot
rely on lexical or syntactic information and identications between variables in the
lexical specication and elements in the interpreted linguistic context need to be
inferred. The dierence is that there are no good o-the-shelf systems for doing
these inferences.
We now proceed through a set of examples taken from our collection of dierent
uses of fall from Dutch, English, French, German, and Russian. The inferences
are generally trivial, but this partly reects the source of the examples, since
dictionaries often give examples in which it is not necessary to use further context
beyond the clause. The annotation new is replaced below by a double line: the new
features are below the double line.
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For the sentence given in (19), The glass fell on the oor, the space dimension is
the default and the oor is a location in that dimension. The glass is obviously
somewhere (on the table, in somebody’s hands), which may be given in the
linguistic context. Glass is moreover a concrete noun. Together, this selects
the specication in (19).
(19) ‘The glass fell on the oor.’
THEME:glass
glass:concrete
nocontrol(glass)
nocause(glass)
SOURCE:location(space)
at(oor,down(SOURCE,space))
at(glass,oor)
movement(glass,SOURCE)
Continuing with the example used to explain the representations above, in (20),
the context needs to put John in a “low” location (to prevent the spatial dimension)
and a “high” posture, e.g. standing. Whether one assumes that John falls to the oor,
in which case he is lying down at the end of the event, or falls into a chair, in which
case he is sitting at the end of the event is a question of what the default value is for
the individual hearer in the posture dimension below standing. Note that defaults
of this kind are not indicated in the abstract specication above and should be
inferred from the context.
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(20) ‘John fell’.
THEME:John
John:concrete
nocontrol(John)
nocause(John)
SOURCE: standing
POSITION: lying_down
lying_down:location(posture)
at(lying_down,down(standing,posture))
at(John,lying_down)
movement(John,standing)
(21) involves a further specialization of posture applied to houses.
(21) ‘The house fell.’
THEME:house
house:concrete
nocontrol(house)
nocause(house)
SOURCE:erect
POSITION:collapsed
collapsed:location(posture)
at(collapsed,down(erect,posture))
at(house,collapsed)
movement(house,erect)
(22) presents another specialization of dimension restricted to military people and
battles. This needs a special constraint in the specication of fall via the proposed
‘life’ dimension: If somebody military is the theme, the movement and its cause are
part of a battle, then the dimension can be life.
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(22) ‘The corporal fell.’
THEME:corporal
corporal:concrete
nocontrol(corporal)
nocause(corporal)
SOURCE:alive
POSITION:dead
dead:location(life)
at(dead,down(alive,life))
at(corporal,dead)
movement(corporal,alive)
(23) would be derivable through the theme type precipitation, which entails the
source to be the sky and the dimension to be space. Precipitation diers from
people, stones and houses by not being a spatio-temporal continuant.
(23) ‘The rain fell.’
THEME:rain
rain:precipitation
nocontrol(rain)
nocause(rain)
SOURCE:sky
POSITION:ground
ground:location(space)
at(ground,down(sky,space))
at(rain,ground)
movement(rain,sky)
Dates induce a stative use of fall and invoke the outcome(process) dimension on a
process called calendar.
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(24) ‘Christmas day falls on a Sunday this year.’
THEME:Christmas
Christmas: date
nocontrol(Christmas)
nocause(Christmas)
SOURCE: location(outcome(calendar))
POSITION: Sunday
at(Sunday,down(calendar,outcome(calendar)))
at(Christmas, Sunday)
A number of Dutch uses involve other kinds of processes that lead something to
be at some location. A Dutch use where the subject determines the process is
given in (25).
(25) De
the
taak
task
valt
fall
op
on
mij.
me
‘It is my task.’
nocontrol(task)
nocause(task)
ME:location(outcome(taskassignment))
at(ME,down(taskassignment,outcome(taskassignment))
at(task,ME)
This is not the place for overly long explanations of the formalism used above,
but some discussion is necessary to make at least some connections with truth-
conditional semantics. Dimensions would be modeled as ordered sets of various
kinds. The hardest is here the default setting, normal space; yet, here are by
now many formalisms to deal with space and a gravity based high-low ordering
over locations (See Aiello et al. 2007). The other dimensions are very limited in
comparison, they essentially are small nite partial orders: life and health have only
two elements, while the complexity of the outcome(process) dimension is mainly in
stating the range of possible outcome locations, e.g. dierent participants in a
lottery, dierent people who can be burdened by some task, success, ease, hardship
and failure for eating, etc.
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Notions like control, cause, theme and at seem to be proper universal semantic
features. The rst two are amenable to a treatment of cause like e.g. the one
pioneered by Pearl (2000) (control would be the ability to change the course of the
event or change the state if whatever has control would want to). The theme would
be a Dowty (1991)-style decomposition in similar semantic features. Finally, at
would be the relation between between objects and where they are, in space or in a
metaphorical extension.
These remarks are not meant as a truth-conditional treatment of the concepts
we develop, but are meant to take away worries in that respect: this subject as been
successfully addressed and there is no reason for thinking that a truth-conditional
account cannot be given. In fact, such accounts will considerably help learning
systems for the word-feature associations by providing a criterion of consistency
for feature bundles.
In this section we provided an overspecied lexical representation for the verb
fall which accounts for all occurrences we found in our data set. In the next section
we discuss, however, that this analysis runs into problems when we look at the
second verb we investigate in the project: run.
5 Observed Production Probabilities and Lexicalisation
The following problem emerges when we turn to run, the second verb in the project
sample after fall. While there is no significant conceptual distinction between English
run and Dutch and German rennen in their primary uses, there are nonetheless very
significant divergences between the verbs in their special uses. In English, machines
and noses run, while in German and Dutch these objects engage in lopen, for which
the best English equivalent is walking. The logic for deriving meanings in use from
the previous section, however, derives the English meaning in use for “De machine
rent”, “De neus rent”, “Der Machine rennt”, and “Die Nase rennt”.
It is just a brute fact that, in these cases, the Dutch and German verbs do not have
these meanings in use. The reason why is obvious: because another verb has won
in these cases as the preferred means of expressing the meaning in use. And the
formalism should be able to express this. It is, however, not easy to come up with
a natural method extending the equivalence classes of distributions over features in
which this can be directly stated.
176
Representing the Lexicon: Identifying Meaning in Use via Overspecication
It is an overgeneration problem: more meanings in use are predicted than
are observed. Yet—at the same time—the logic and the over-determined lexical
specications seem on the right track.
The correct way to rule out unwanted meanings in use in a probabilistic setting
is to add production constraints in interpretation. It seems a correct observation
that Dutch and German speakers select lopen or laufen when confronted with the
meaning in use given by English: “the machine runs” or “the nose runs”. This
section recasts the previous proposal to incorporate this dependency on production.
There should be a part of the production mechanism which assigns words to
bundles of features with a certain probability: lexical selection. This process can
be captured as a function f that maps pairs made up from a bundle of semantic
features and a word to a probability. The function values will often be 0 for all
words for a certain bundle: the bundle is not a sensible meaning in use or it is
sensible but lexemes are missing. It will also very often be 0 for most words: those
words were never used to express this bundle. The function can be read o directly
from a corpus of word and meaning in use pairs as in (26). The function gives
the frequency of the word for the bundle divided by the frequency of the bundle.
Notice that the precise bundles of features count: a use of w to express a superset c
of b does not count as a use of w for b. We assume here that the corpus is given as a
set C of triples <index, bundle, word>.
(26) f(b)(w) = |{j:<j,b,w>∈C}||{j:∃w′<j,b,w′>∈C}|
The function counts the number of indices at which w expresses b and divides that
number by the number of indices at which b is expressed by any word whatsoever.
The function therefore measures the strength with which a bundle of features
keys a lexeme and can be seen as a component of what determines lexical choice.
The rule could be to choose that w for b for which f(b)(w) is maximal.
The function f—or the data from which it can be read o—can be equated
with the mental lexicon. The mental lexicon cannot be equated with the set of
distributions over semantic features keyed by specic lexical items as was assumed
in the last section, since that does not give a handle on production, which we
need to deal with our overgeneration problem, as will be shown below.
There are no problems with multi-word lexical items. In fact, it is natural to
assume that certain sets of features would correspond to groups of lexemes. All
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that one would need to do is to consider a generalization of the function in whichw
ranges over bags of words. There would then no longer be any principled division
between multi-word lexemes and groups of lexemes that jointly express the bundle,
and this is as it should be. The dierence would be in the possibility to regain
the probability of the bag for the bundle from the probabilities of its components
for parts of the bundle: do we get the same number or is the probability of the
combination higher? In the last case, it has become or is becoming an idiom. While
this denitely must be explored further, let’s ignore composition for the time being
and let w simply range over words. It would seem that the revision fares better as a
data structure that can be learned and represented by the brain as an association
and is better suited for multi-word expressions than the proposal from the last
section to equate the mental lexicon with probability distributions pw(b) over the
words w of the language. While we leave these issues open, it is still the case that
the competition we dene below, sometimes is between a word and a multi-word
expression or between multi-word expressions.
This new account of the mental lexicon can help with the problem at hand. If
a meaning in use is just expressed dierently, it cannot be the meaning in use
of the word for which it was hypothesized (cf. the use of lopen ‘walk’ rather than
rennen ‘run’). The earlier approach does not need to be given up, it merely needs
an amendment in which it is checked for an interpretation b that the production
probability f(b)(w) 6= 0 while for another word w′ f(b)(w′) > 0.
But then, what should be used for arriving at meanings in use? At rst sight this
seems problematic. The revision gives a criterion for having found the meaning in
use. The new data structure gives the likelihood p(w|b) of the word w for the
meaning in use b. If a prior p(b) for the set of features b is given, the most probable
interpretation is argmaxbp(b)f(b)(w), the feature bundle b for which the product
of the prior probability p(b) and the likelihood as given by f applied to b and
w is maximal.5 But how can it be guaranteed that that is indeed the maximal
bundle that ts in the context? p(b) will be bounded by p(b′) if b′ ⊂ b. And the
likelihood is learned from experience as f . It would seem that this does not give the
prediction that larger bundles are preferred. A second problem is that it gives
no results in case w has not been used for b before.
5 That this is the most probable interpretation follows by Bayes’ theorem. Models of interpretation in
which the most probable interpretation is computed by nding a maximum for p(b)p(w|b), the
product of the prior and the likelihood of the interpretation are standard in signal processing and
computer vision.
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The solution is not to give up on the earlier proposal but to use it as a model of
Bayesian interpretation. This can be done since f almost directly reconstructs
the distribution pw over semantic feature bundles keyed by a lexeme w. In (27),
pw(b) is dened, where b is a semantic feature bundle. To do this correctly, we need
to measure the frequency of b, m(b), in the corpus as its frequency divided by
the corpus size. F is the set of all features.
(27) pw(b) =
Σb⊆b′⊆Fm(b
′)f(b′)(w)
Σb′⊆Fm(b′)f(b′)(w)
pw(b) measures how often w is used for b within all uses of w.
While humans learn f automatically, it seems that linguists like ourselves are
better in discovering pw directly from lexical and internet data, with semantic
blocking occasionally oering a window on properties of f that cannot be recovered
from the functions pw .
Lexical interpretation is still computing argmaxbp(b)p(w|b), but there will be
more information in p(w|b) than directly follows from f . Any semantic feature
s ∈ b associated with w helps to increase the likelihood of w: p(w|b). But
simultaneously f(b)(w) is a lter on the result, blocking certain realisations, i.e. this
can make p(w|b) = 0. If there are f(b)(w′) with a high value, b has lexical means
of expression and using w for b will be unlikely if f(b)(w) = 0. So if f(b)(w) has a
high value while f(b)(w′) = 0, b is not a proper interpretation of w′.6 So the
new “mental lexicon” can continue as the base for the solution in Section 4.
Let us recapitulate these observations in some denitions:
(28) Lexical interpretation: b is a lexical interpretation of w i f(b)(w) >> 0.7
(29) Standard lexical choice: w is a lexical choice for b i f(b)(w) >> 0.
(30) Smolensky/Hogeweg interpretation: An optimal interpretation can be
dened by the following three constraints:
1.All variables are bound from the context, all forced selections are executed, all
absolute features projected, and the interpretation is closed under modus ponens
2. It is consistent with the context
3. It is maximal
6 This gives a simple intuitive solution for the “cause to die”-problem of (McCawley 1968). “Black Bill
caused the sheri to die” cannot “mean” under this rule that he caused him to die in some normal way.
“Cause-to-die” is blocked to mean that by the lexical expression “kill”.
7 We require a proper number of occurrences, beyond what could be attributed to error.
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In terms of OT, (1) gives conditions on candidate interpretations and makes these con-
ditions thereby absolute. (2) and (3) are identical with FIT and STRENGTH and can
be defeated: a new statement may correct the context, non-absolute features can be
dropped to gain consistency. (2) is entailed by prior maximisation in Bayesian inter-
pretation. (3) is part of likelihood maximisation. So for practical purposes and within
the enterprise of computing lexical meanings in use from abstract specifications,
it seems reasonable to equate Bayesian interpretation and Smolensky/Hogeweg.
(31) Proper lexical choice: w is a proper lexical choice for b in c if w is a lexical
choice for b and b is a proper interpretation of w in c
Many bs will not have a lexical choice: in that case w is a proper lexical choice for b
in c i b is a proper interpretation of w in c
(32) Proper interpretation: b is a proper interpretation ofw in c i b is computed
by Smolensky/Hogeweg for w in c unless there exists w′ 6= w where w′ is
a lexical choice for b while w is not a lexical choice.
The situation in which the interpretation b found forw cannot be lexically expressed
(no word has a non-zero observed probability for it) is interesting, because now it is
reasonable to stick with the hypothesis found by Bayesian interpretation, i.e. FIT>
STRENGTH that the meaning in use is b: a new meaning in use for the word w was
found. This would be an extension of the use observed so far.
The information in f is typically partially reecting ongoing learning. Every 0
may have the meaning that the use of w for b has not been observed so far. But
there are situations where the 0 can be taken seriously. The rst case would be
for inconsistent bundles. The second case would be the case where the bundle b has
been expressed often enough to be condent that w will not be used for the bundle.
In all other cases, one can learn that w is used for b by encountering a use and
inferring that b is its meaning in use. And one use is good enough.
Like (Hogeweg 2009), we assume that there is the beginning of an account of
metaphorical use of lexical items in this setup. The information in f can block or
select an hypothesis obtained by the reasoning that computes meanings in use from
lexical specications, the new version of FIT > MAX. It however does not block
unobserved hypotheses and it should not. These are—or are from the perspective of
the learning structure f—metaphorical extensions. Since learning f is also learning
180
Representing the Lexicon: Identifying Meaning in Use via Overspecication
the distribution over semantic features pw , it follows that new hypotheses can also
be obtained by overriding zero’s in that distribution. The latter are new metaphors.
Now it is not easy, but possible to come up with new metaphors for fall. For
example, in the project we might perhaps say (speaking Dutch or Russian) that the
word rennen falls to Lotte, meaning that it is her task to collect uses of rennen. The
specication rules that out even for Dutch: words are not associated conventionally
with a process that assigns them to humans. But as a project member, Lotte can
be assigned tasks and in the project words are tasks: a new metaphor. It would
seem that one can deal with cases like this by shifting from a denition by listing of
process (necessary for Dutch: many processes work, but not all) to an intensional
characterisation (task or reward assigning process). A more proper exploration of
these limits and ways of overcoming them is for future work.
Accordingly, we nd ourselves siding with Giambattista Vico in claiming that
originally—at least in acquisition—language use is poetry in which everything
is interpreted metaphorically (Pompa 2002). Learning from use slowly leads to
prose, i.e. the semantic discipline brought by conventional means of expression
emerging from experience.
6 Conclusion
We have argued that the traditional view on the lexicon does not oer a way of
accounting for the selection of meanings in use, a task that humans seem to perform
routinely with high degrees of success. The proposals of Smolensky and Hogeweg
for dealing with selection by means of overspecication were then examined and
found to be wanting for the meaning of lexical words. We argue that decomposition
of word meanings and meanings in use in terms of moderately universal semantic
features is possible and consistent with truth-conditional semantics and typology.
But that more structure is needed over the features than just set membership.
The method can be made to work in a natural way, if rather than a set of semantic
features one uses equivalence classes over distributions over bundles of semantic
features expressed by the words. Such equivalence classes oer a natural inventory
of operations over semantic features and we show that with these operations, one
can arrive at a natural and eective representation for the verb fall that can be
used to model the interaction with the context that performs selection.
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The approach however overgenerates, since in many cases the interaction with
the context will yield feature bundles that should be expressed dierently in certain
languages. In order to remedy that we propose that lexical representation takes the
form of two functions: f that maps feature bundles and words to a probability
and m that maps feature bundles to the probability that they will be expressed.
It is now possible to dene the necessary semantic blocking as the requirement that
f should not give zero for the interpretation b and the word w, while giving a high
value to b and w′. At the same time, the distributions pw over semantic features
can be recovered from f and m and oer—like the Smolensky/Hogeweg proposal
does—the rst steps of an account of new metaphors.
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